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Why is interest income taxed more heavily than other forms of capital income? This differential tax
treatment has generated substantial tax arbitrage, resulting in lower tax revenue, efficiency costs,
and apparently net gains to rich borrowers and net losses to poor lenders, together suggesting that
this tax treatment makes no sense on welfare grounds.
In examining this argument more formally, this paper reveals two omitted considerations that can
help explain the existing tax treatment. First, the forecasted increase in the market interest rate
results in a redistribution from rich borrowers to poor lenders. Yet this redistribution comes at no
marginal efficiency cost, starting from a situation with no distortions to portfolio choice, so at the
margin dominates further redistribution through the income tax.
In addition, information about an individual's portfolio choice reveals information about her
earnings ability, even controlling for observed labor income, if those who are more able tend to be
less risk averse. By making use of this extra information about earnings ability, the tax system can
be better tailored to redistribute from able to less able, for any given efficiency cost.
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Under existing tax law, income from bonds faces a higher eﬀective tax rate than income
from virtually any other ﬁnancial or real asset, since the entire nominal return is fully
taxable. The resulting tax arbitrage leads to those in high tax brackets borrowing heavily
to buy more lightly taxed assets, while the bonds issued end up being owned by those
in lower or zero tax brackets. As documented by Gordon and Slemrod (1988) using U.S.
data for 1983, corporations and richer individuals saved enough in taxes on their large net
interest deductions to oﬀset essentially all corporate and personal income taxes collected
on all other forms of income from capital. At least ignoring implications for the market
interest rate, the existing tax treatment of interest income/payments seems to generate not
only a large revenue loss and large distortions to portfolios, but also perverse distributional
eﬀects, with corporations and the rich saving substantially on taxes through their interest
deductions and the poor paying taxes on their positive interest income.
As a result, the existing tax treatment of interest income and payments certainly seems
very puzzling. Why is this tax treatment so common across countries, and so stable over
time? It is not for lack of proposals to change it.1
The objective of this paper is to examine more closely the optimal tax treatment of
interest income, to see whether the current tax treatment is as perverse as portrayed above.
The intuition we start with, following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), is that commodity taxes
should provide no net welfare gain when nonlinear income taxes are also available, as long
as the utility function is weakly separable between leisure and consumption. In particular,
this result suggests that income from savings should not be taxed, since such a tax is
equivalent to a commodity tax on future consumption. Following Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), we examine the welfare eﬀects of including a small fraction of net interest income
in the personal tax base, starting from an optimal nonlinear tax on observed labor income.
I would very much like to thank Joan Muysken and Soren Bo Nielsen as well as two referees for
comments on an earlier draft.
1 See for example U.S. Treasury (1984), which focused heavily on limiting the amount of tax arbitrage
using debt, in part by proposing to tax real rather than nominal interest income.
1Contrary to the initial intuition, the model does forecast that net interest income should
enter the tax base. The model describes two sources of potential welfare gain from this tax
treatment. First, a marginal shift from labor income taxes to taxes on net interest income
causes the market-clearing interest rate to rise. Given the observation in the data that
the poor are net creditors and the rich net debtors, this rise in the interest rate provides a
net transfer from rich to poor. While further such transfers from rich to poor through the
income tax come at the price of higher distortion costs suﬃcient to leave welfare unaﬀected
at the margin, introducing small portfolio distortions provides distributional gains with no
marginal eﬃciency costs.2
Second, even conditional on observed labor income, observed bond holdings can well
provide information about an individual’s underlying ability. By making use of this infor-
mation, the tax system can better approximate a tax on unobserved ability.3 Formally, we
assume that, for any given observed value for labor income, those who are more able are
less risk averse, plausibly because they have a larger reserve of potential earnings available
as a reserve to help absorb losses. As a result, the less able hold more bonds and less eq-
uity, everything else equal. While the forecasted result from including net interest income
in the tax base is the same type of tax arbitrage seen in the data, the model also implies
that the resulting increase in the market interest rate is suﬃcient that the beneﬁciaries of
this arbitrage are largely the less able lenders, with the most able borrowers left largely
unaﬀected.
The paper concludes with a brief set of conclusions.
1. Taxation of interest income
The economy consists of I individuals, who potentially diﬀer in their assets, their wage
rate, their taste for leisure, and their degree of risk aversion. The role of the tax system
2 See Naito (1999) for a similar result, where small commodity taxes favoring (penalizing) industries
employing primarily low (high) skilled workers yield distributional gains through changes in relative wage
rates, at the margin with no oﬀsetting eﬃciency costs.
3 See Saez (2002) for a more general demonstration that commodity taxes may be appropriate whenever
consumption of a good is correlated with the social marginal utility of income at any given level of observed
labor income.
2is to collect revenue in an equitable fashion in order to ﬁnance government expenditures.
Distorting rather than lump-sum taxes should be used only if they improve the distribution
of utilities. By assumption, the more able (those with a higher potential wage rate) are
viewed to have higher utility, regardless of the degree to which they spend their potential
income on leisure vs. goods. However, the government does not observe ability, only
labor income. As in Mirrlees (1971), it then designs some nonlinear tax on labor income,
trading oﬀ the distributional gains with the implied eﬃciency losses from distortions to
labor supply decisions.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) then show that if the utility function is separable between
leisure and consumption then there would be no distributional gain yet an eﬃciency loss
from introducing commodity taxes. Given this separability, consumption patterns simply
depend on observed labor income, so provide no additional information about underlying
ability. Using a narrower tax base, through use of commodity taxes, then introduces
additional distortions without any potential distributional gains.
Since future vs. current consumption are examples of diﬀerent consumption goods,
higher tax rates on future vs. current consumption would then be inappropriate. Following
this argument, we will ignore general taxes on the return to savings.
Is there a case, though, for including net interest income, at least to some degree, in
the personal income tax base? By the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) argument, there are
no such grounds if an individual’s net demand for bonds is simply a function of labor
income, since then a tax on labor income provides the same distributional eﬀect without
introducing further distortions. However, portfolio choice also depends on an individual’s
degree of risk aversion. If the degree of risk aversion is correlated with the individual’s
wage rate, conditional on observed labor income, as we will argue should be expected, then
there will be grounds for making use of a tax (or subsidy) on net interest income, in order
to better link an individual’s tax payments to her underlying ability. Our objective will
be to explore the nature of the optimal tax treatment of net interest income.
In order to develop this argument, assume that individual i has ﬁnancial assets of Fit
at date t but also receives a ﬂow of potential income equal to witT −τt(witT)e a c hp e r i o d ,
where T is the maximum time available in a period, wit is individual i’s wage rate, and
3τt(.) represents the nonlinear tax schedule on labor income. For simplicity, we assume that
this ﬂow of potential net-of-tax labor income is nonstochastic.4 If the after-tax real interest




[wisT − τs(wisT)]e−θisrds. (1)
Total assets then equal Ait ≡ Fit + Hit. The income from these assets will ﬁnance the
purchase of a vector of consumption goods each period s, where this vector includes leisure
as well as goods and services.
The individual can invest the ﬁnancial assets Fit in either equity or bonds, where the
return on equity is risky but where for simplicity the return on bonds is riskless. Let
the amount of equity purchased be denoted by Sit and that of bonds by Bit. Implicitly,
however, the individual is investing her entire wealth, Ait = Fit + Hit,i ne q u i t ya n d
bonds. While her total equity investments remain equal to Sit, her total bond investments
implicitly equal Bit + Hit.L e tsit (bit) denote the fraction of the total portfolio invested
in equity (bonds), so that sit = Sit/Ait and bit =1− sit.
Since the aggregate holdings of bonds in the economy are zero (for every lender there




i Sit.5 Therefore, aggregate equity investments
are immediately determined given aggregate ﬁnancial assets. Our focus, though, will be
on the portfolio composition of diﬀerent investors.
4 Following the labor contracting literature, the ﬁrm’s equity holders can more cheaply bear the risk
from the ﬁrm than can its workers, so that the cost of labor to the ﬁrm is minimized if workers are pro-
vided a nonstochastic wage. While in general, introducing a stochastic wage will introduce computational
diﬃculties, Merton (1990, pp. 147-9) shows that results generalize without substantive changes under
particular assumptions. In particular, the present value of future labor income is simply replaced by the
discounted present value of the certainty-equivalent of future labor income. In addition, if the random
process in labor income is correlated with the random return on some ﬁnancial assets, these ﬁnancial assets
can be used as a hedge, altering portfolio choice accordingly. Such an added link between portfolio choice
and observed labor income would not introduce any qualitative change to our analysis, however, since the
link with unobserved ability would remain present.
5 We implicitly assume here that all borrowers and lenders are individuals, so ignore both government
borrowing and ﬁrm borrowing. Including these additional forms of borrowing would require modeling
how the amount of government and ﬁrm borrowing changes in response to changes in the tax treatment
for individuals, and the resulting change in market interest rates. Corporate borrowing incentives would
remain unaﬀected, though, if the corporate tax rate equals τ
wt, as deﬁned below, so that a ﬁrm’s after-tax
interest rate remains unaﬀected. The government’s cost of borrowing remains unaﬀected as well if the
average tax rate faced on the additional bond holdings again equals τ
wt. The pattern of these additional
bond holdings depend on who bears the added taxes in the future to repay this debt. While some changes
in ﬁrm and government incentives, so in their behavior, are inevitable, the qualitative results in the paper
would remain unaﬀected.




where g is the expected return on equity, dt captures any nonstochastic time trends and
dz represents continuous Brownian motion with standard deviation σ. Within the model,
the return on equity is untaxed. Our focus will be on the desired tax treatment of interest
income/payments.6 To begin with, however, we should note that a uniform tax rate on
both interest income and interest payments collects zero revenue and has no eﬀect on
incentives. Since the aggregate supply of bonds to the economy is zero, aggregate interest
income and aggregate interest payments are equal in size, so that revenue from taxes
on interest income would be exactly oﬀset by the revenue loss from interest deductions.
In addition, the pretax interest rate would adjust so that the after-tax interest rate is
unaﬀected by the tax for all individuals.
Following current tax provisions, however, we assume that the potential tax rate on net
interest income is proportional to the individual’s marginal tax rate on labor income. In
particular, consider letting the individual’s actual income tax payments equal τt(withit +
µtrBit), where hit equals actual hours of work. The resulting net-of-tax marginal interest
rate faced by individual i is then (1−µtτ 
it)r, so that by assumption θit =( 1−µtτ 
it). The




Our focus will be on whether the optimal µt is nonzero, and if so its optimal sign.
For simplicity, we will ignore the general equilibrium eﬀects of a change in capital
investment on factor and consumer prices by assuming a linear technology. The wage rate
at a given skill level will be the numeraire, and all skill levels are assumed to be perfect
6 More generally, our focus is on the diﬀerential tax treatment of debt and equity. In particular, a
uniform tax on all asset income will not distort portfolios. (This assumes that the risk transferred to the
government through random tax payments is ultimately returned to shareholders. See Gordon (1985) for
further discussion.) By normalizing taxes on equity income to zero, we will examine whether taxes on debt
should be nonzero.
5substitutes.7 Given this linear technology and the ﬁxed wage rates, the return to equity
remains ﬁxed as well.
Denote the rate of consumption expenditures (on leisure as well as goods and services)
at time t by consumer i by Cit. This consumer’s indirect utility from the ﬂow of consump-
tion at date t is denoted by V (Cit;wit,pt), where pt represents the vector of consumer







where γi represents the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and where γi > 0t oc a p t u r e






where ρ is the individual’s utility discount rate.
Formally, we will assume that individuals diﬀer in their degree of risk aversion, and that
those with higher values of lifetime potential labor income tend to have a lower value ofγi.
However, this utility function can be taken to be a local approximation to a more general
function, shared by individuals, in which the degree of risk aversion is itself a declining
function of the individual’s value of Cit.
Individuals choose their portfolio allocation at each point in time as well as their con-
sumption rate to maximize their expected utility as deﬁned in equation (3). By Ito’s
lemma, we can take a second-order Taylor approximation of an individual’s utility, so that
the optimization problem can be reexpressed as8
Wit =m a x {C,b,s}E0





Here, dAit represents the change in the individual’s real wealth over time. Decisions are
made subject to the individual’s budget constraint that bit + sit =1 .
7 Without this assumption, various other supplementary taxes/subsidies can be justiﬁed. See Naito
(1999) for further discussion.
8 We follow closely here the derivation used in Merton (1990).
6At any interior optimum for portfolios, increasing sit and decreasing bit to compensate
has no eﬀect on utility at the margin, implying that9
g − θitr = γisitσ
2, (5)
yielding a conventional expression for the risk premium on equity. Therefore, sit varies
across individuals only to the extent that θit or γi varies. In particular, sit takes on a high
value for those with low values of θit and/or γi.
Consider ﬁrst the outcome with µt =0 ,a n ds oθit = 1. We will then explore how
welfare changes as the government deviates from this choice.
If µt =0and if all individuals have the same γi, then the model forecasts that all
individuals have the same fraction, s,o ft h e i ro ve r a l la s s e t s Ait invested in equity. With

















In particular, those with high potential future earnings relative to their ﬁnancial assets
will have a higher fraction of their ﬁnancial assets invested in equity, and therefore a lower
fraction invested in bonds. Those with a relatively high value of Hit/Fit will therefore be
in debt while those with a relatively low value of Hit/Fit will have positive bond holdings.
Not surprisingly, the young will therefore be in debt, since their current ﬁnancial assets are
small relative to their human capital.11 The old, in contrast, normally have substantial
ﬁnancial assets, yet the present value of their future labor earnings (plus pension income)
will be relatively small, so they will be net lenders.
9 We make use of a standard result here that AW (A)/W (A)=−γi in the equilibrium to such a model.
10 Since

i Bit = 0, market prices must adjust so that s

i Hit =( 1− s)

i Fit.A sar e s u l t ,w ei n f e r
that 0 <s<1.
11 We have assumed perfect capital markets, however. If, due to adverse selection reasons, the bond
market works poorly, then young borrowers will face credit constraints. In this case, subsidies to loans can
be appropriate on eﬃciency grounds.
7Even if γi is the same for all individuals, note that the size of sit (and bit)c o n ve y s
information about potential labor income, Hit, at least after controlling for the individual’s
age and the size of current ﬁnancial assets. In particular, those with high potential labor
income will hold more equity and less debt. If the high skilled also have a lower γi,a sw e
assume, this relationship is only strengthened.
Allowing for such variation in γi across individuals seems essential in order to make
sense of the data on portfolio choice. At least U.S. data12 suggest that the rich tend to be
large net debtors, while the poor hold a much larger fraction of their ﬁnancial portfolios in
bonds.13 Without variation in γi, equations (6) and (7) imply that this can occur only if
those with high observed labor income tend to have higher values of Hit/Fit,a ta n yg i ve n
age. Yet observed labor income, as a fraction of assets, if anything is lower for the rich
than the poor — ﬁnancial assets are distributed much more unequally than labor income.
That Hit consists of the present value of observed labor income plus the present value of
leisure implies that the skilled could still have a higher ratio Hit/Fit if they consumed
enough more leisure relative to the poor. Yet hours of work do not seem to vary much
with the wage rate, while the age of retirement if anything is later for those with high wage
rates. If the rich are enough less risk averse, however, then we can make sense of observed
portfolio choices.
We have assumed in addition, however, that the degree of risk aversion depends not
on observed labor income but on potential labor income. This is consistent, for example,
with equity holdings being higher for the educated, even conditional on observed labor
income.14
Consider now whether, starting from µt = 0, the government would want to raise µt.
To address this question, we ﬁrst need to assume some explicit objective function for the
12 See, for example, the ﬁgures in Gordon and Slemrod (1988). Their ﬁgures do not control for age.
However, the rich inevitably would tend to be older than the poor, so should have been net lenders for
this reason if in fact γi w e r et h es a m ef o re v e r y o n e .
13 Until recently, only a small fraction of individuals (primarily the rich) had any equity holdings.
14 For some empirical support for this relationship, see Poterba and Samwick (forthcoming). While they
do not control for an individual’s wage rate, they do ﬁnd that more educated individuals hold more equity,
even after controlling for a ﬂexible function of both current income (in part as a proxy for tax incentives)
and current wealth.
8government. In particular, assume that at each date the government chooses µt and the















where λ is the weight put on government revenue.15
























Following Saez (2002), consider the impact instead of modifying the structure of the income
tax so as to impose the same average tax change on those with each value of labor income,
z ≡ wh, as occurs when µt changes. In particular, consider the impact of the set of tax
changes dτ(z)=τ (z)rt ¯ B(z), where ¯ B(z) is the average value of Bit among those with
labor income equal to z. Since the nonlinear income tax schedule has simultaneously been
chosen to maximize social welfare, we know that these changes in the tax schedule have
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i λBit =0s i n c e

i Bit =0 .
































Here, R is a shorthand for the combined policy changes in µt and τt,a n drn
s(zi)=rs(1 −
µsτ (zi)).
In the setting of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), these combined tax changes would have
no net eﬀect on labor supply, so that the right-hand side of equation (11) would equal
zero. In addition, given the separability they assume between leisure and consumption,
Bit simply depends on z, so that the covariance term on the left-hand size equals zero.
Their paper does not consider general equilibrium price eﬀects, so that the second term
on the right-hand side is ignored. As a result, the optimal µt would equal zero.
The setting here is more general than that considered by Atkinson and Stiglitz. To begin
with, leisure is a function of time, rather than a scalar. In addition, even if the underlying
direct utility function at each date in our model is weakly separable between leisure and
consumption, the overall utility function is not in general separable between leisure and
consumption. We also allow for both heterogeneity in tastes and general equilibrium price
changes.
What then can be said about whether the inequality in equation (11) holds? Consider
ﬁrst the eﬀects of these combined tax changes on labor supply. In general, labor supply
can certainly change in response to such a tax reform, and in diﬀerent directions for net
lenders and net borrowers, and diﬀerently at diﬀerent dates. However, it is diﬃcult to say
anything in general about the sign of the resulting eﬀect on government revenue. Given the
empirical evidence of low elasticities of labor supply, combined with the result in Atkinson
and Stiglitz that this term is precisely zero in their setting, we presume that this term will
be small relative to the other terms. Any later results, however, must be qualiﬁed by the
ambiguity concerning the size (and sign) of this term.
Much more can be said about the other two terms. In the ﬁrst term on the left-hand
side, the covariance describes the degree to which observed bond holdings provide infor-
mation about an individual’s underlying ability, even given their observed labor income. If
10the covariance is nonzero, then this information can be used to redesign the tax structure
to better approximate a tax on unobserved ability.18 Given the assumptions of our model,
the more able are less risk-averse, so everything else equal invest less in bonds (or borrow
more). In addition, given observed labor income, the more able have higher potential in-
come so by equation (7) would hold fewer bonds. As a result, this covariance term should
be positive for all values of z. Aiding net lenders at the expense of net borrowers would
then imply transfers from the more able to the less able, conditional on observed labor
income. The question then is what tax treatment of net interest income accomplishes
this. If the ∂rn
s(zi)/∂R are mostly positive, then this eﬀect provides support for taxing
net interest income.
The second term describes the impact on welfare arising from any changes in the market
interest rate, even ignoring any heterogeneity in households conditional on observed labor
income. If those with low observed income tend to be net lenders and those with high
income net borrowers, then an increase in the market interest rate is a distributional gain.
Starting from µt = 0, introducing portfolio distortions has no eﬃciency cost at the margin
(ignoring impacts on labor supply), so that the resulting changes in the interest rate can
provide distributional gains with no oﬀsetting eﬃciency costs. In contrast, further use of
the income tax to redistribute from rich to poor implies oﬀsetting eﬃciency costs that are
large enough starting from the optimal tax structure to yield no net gain.19 If ∂rs/∂R > 0,
then this term provides support for taxing interest income.
To proceed further, we need information about the signs of ∂rs/∂R and ∂rn
s(zi)/∂R.
















Consider ﬁrst the impact of the policy changes on interest rates at date t.A td a t et,
changes in τ 
t have no impact on rt, when evaluated at µt = 0. What about ∂rt/∂µt?I f
18 Saez (2002) has made this point in a more general context.
19 This is just the intuition developed in Naito (1999) in a diﬀerent context.
11we diﬀerentiate the market-clearing condition at date t with respect to µt and evaluate at











This expression is a weighted average of the τ 
it, with the rich and the less risk averse
getting more weight. As a result, this weighted average tax rate should be close to the top
marginal tax rate. Denote this weighted average tax rate by τ 
wt.
Since 0 <τ  
wt < 1, it immediately follows that ∂rt/∂µt > 0. Therefore the second term
in equation (11) at date t is positive.
What about ∂rn
t (zi)/∂µt,e va l u a t e da t µt = 0? Since by deﬁnition rn
t (zi)=( 1 −µtτ 
it)rt,
we ﬁnd that ∂rn
t (zi)/∂µt =( τ 
wt−τ 
it)rt. Therefore, ∂rn
t (zi)/∂µt > 0 for all investors with
τ 
it <τ  
wt, and conversely. Given that τ 
wt should be close to the top marginal tax rate, we
infer that ∂rn
it/∂µt is positive except for the richest individuals; almost all investors should
face an increased after-tax interest rate, and more so the lower the τ 
it they face, when net
interest income is made taxable/tax deductible.
As a result, unless the covariance in the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of equation
(11) is much larger for those with high observed labor income than for other individuals,20
this ﬁrst term at date t is also positive.
What about changes in interest rates at future dates? The only potential impact on
future interest rates of policy changes at date t arises from changes in savings, so in the
Ais caused by these combined tax changes. These impacts, arising from a marginal tax
change during a brief time period dt are necessarily of second order. We can therefore
ignore them.
Together, these results imply that the optimal value of µt is in fact positive, consistent
with observed tax structures. Evaluated at µt = 0, there are no marginal eﬃciency costs
due to portfolio distortions arising from a marginal change in µt, since portfolios are
allocated eﬃciently when µt =0 . A sµt increases, portfolio distortions and the resulting
20 This covariance equals the correlation between V 
it times the standard deviations of both Bit and V 
it.
There is no reason to expect the size of the correlation to diﬀer systematically with ability level. While
the standard deviation of Bit should be an increasing function of income, the standard deviation of V 
it
should plausibly be much larger among those with low reported labor income. As a result, there is no
clear presumption about how the size of this covariance varies across income levels.
12eﬃciency losses grow. At the optimal value of µt, these marginal eﬃciency losses just
oﬀset the marginal distributional gains from including an additional fraction of net interest
























The right-hand side of this equation measures the marginal eﬃciency (and revenue) loss
from increasing the fraction of net interest income included in the tax base. As emphasized
for example in Gordon and Slemrod (1988), the revenue loss from the resulting tax arbitrage
can be very large. At the margin, the loss from increased arbitrage as µt increases just
oﬀsets the gains described above.22
2. Conclusions
Why is interest income taxed so much more heavily than other forms of capital income?
This diﬀerential tax treatment of bonds vs. other assets has generated substantial use of
debt to reduce overall tax payments, through the rich borrowing from the poor to invest in
more lightly taxed assets. The result is substantially lower tax revenue, sizable eﬃciency
costs, and apparently net gains to rich borrowers and net losses to poor lenders, together
suggesting that this tax treatment makes no sense on welfare grounds.
We reexamine this argument more formally, and ﬁnd that taxes on net interest income
can well be justiﬁed within an optimal tax framework. To begin with, the forecasted
increase in the market interest rate results in a redistribution from rich borrowers to
poor lenders. Yet this redistribution comes at no marginal eﬃciency cost, starting from
a situation with no distortions to portfolio choice, so at the margin dominates further
redistribution through the income tax.
In addition, information about an individual’s portfolio choice can potentially reveal
information about her earnings ability, even controlling for observed labor income. We
21 For simplicity of notation, we ignore here the feedback onto labor supply.
22 Note, however, that at higher values of µt portfolios become more unequal, with the rich borrowing
more and the poor lending more. This implies that the marginal distributional gains also grow as µt
increases.
13presume that those with higher potential income will be less risk averse, and so invest
relatively more heavily in equity than those with lower potential income, even holdings
observed income ﬁxed. By making use of this extra information about earnings ability,
the tax system can be better tailored to redistribute from able to less able, for any given
eﬃciency cost. Given the sizable forecasted increase in the market interest rate in response
to a tax on net interest income, this tax does aid low-ability lenders at the expense of more
able borrowers.
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